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Abstract
Despite fiscal stress, public confidence in the National Health Service (NHS) remains strong; privatisation has 
not hollowed out the service. But if long term challenges are to be overcome, pragmatism not rhetoric should 
be the guide.
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It was late in coming. But in the last desperate days of his campaign in Britain’s May 2015 General Election. Ed Miliband, Labour’s then leader, remembered his cue. 
“The future of the NHS is at risk in the way it hasn’t been for 
a generation,”1 he warned. And his voice was one among 
many. So Powell’s anthology of apocalyptic prophecies and 
premature obituaries continues to grow, underlining the 
importance of his theme: that inflationary rhetoric risks 
robbing words of their meaning. What is it about the National 
Health Service (NHS) that prompts linguistic excess and 
muddle? And does this dramaturgy matter?
That the NHS is now once again in financial trouble is beyond 
doubt.2,3 In its Five Year Forward View4 NHS England – the 
service’s managerial head office – identified “a mismatch 
between resources and patient needs of nearly £30 billion a 
year by 2020/21.” “Transformational changes” in the way the 
NHS operates could, it argued, close the gap. But £8 billion 
was needed to grease the wheels of change. Scepticism 
about the ability to implement “transformational change” 
on the scale required over the next 5 years and to close the 
gap is general. However, in the General Election all parties, 
including the victorious Conservatives, competed to pledge 
extra funding. So for the immediate future the NHS’s fiscal 
future seems assured – though the long term prospects are 
a different matter and come the 2020 General Election, the 
political parties may once again be competing in their claims 
to be able to save the patient’s life. 
But if the current fiscal panic has been exaggerated, is there 
other evidence that the NHS is tottering towards its grave? 
Drawing up a balance sheet is difficult because of the sheer 
complexity of the service, because there are wide variations 
in performance and because the notion of performance is 
itself contested and multidimensional. There are nearly 300 
indicators which can be used to monitor changes over time 
in the quality of services provided,5 giving ample scope for 
picking and choosing to make a case for either the prosecution 
or defence. Some indicators (for example, hospital infections) 
show an improvement. Others (for example, the number of 
people having to wait more than 4 hours in Accident and 
Emergency departments) show a marginal deterioration. 
Staffing figures also offer scope for rival interpretations. 
While there has been a rise in the number of doctors and 
nurses – in contrast to a sharp reduction in management staff 
– this turns into a slight fall when recalculated to take account 
of population growth.6 Overall, then, the picture is of a service 
creaking at the edges – with staff hard pressed – but as yet far 
from terminal decline. 
The evidence of public opinion points to the same conclusion. 
The 2014 British Social Attitudes Survey7 showed that 
support for the NHS remains as strong as ever: 89% of those 
surveyed agreed with the proposition that the government 
should support a national health system that is tax funded, 
free at the point of use and provides comprehensive care for 
all. Further, 26%, thought that the NHS had improved in the 
years of the coalition government, 28% thought it had got 
worse and 43% thought that the NHS had neither improved 
nor deteriorated. Interestingly, in view of the emotion aroused 
by the word “privatisation,” 61% either had no preference as 
between treatment in an NHS hospital or in a private facility 
or preferred the private sector. And in the case of Accident 
and Emergency departments, where delays featured strongly 
in the media, the patient experience score – which measures 
patient views on the care they receive – actually showed an 
improvement in 2014.8 
Public opinion evidence points to a paradox. Precisely because 
the NHS is such a cherished national institution, politicians in 
opposition – like Miliband and so many of his predecessors 
quoted by Powell – have an incentive to exaggerate its failings. 
For if the NHS were not failing, why should voters turn to 
them as its saviours? But, of course, politicians are not the only 
ones with an incentive to exaggerate. Commenting on what 
was already by then “the longest death bed scene in British 
institutional history,” 30 odd years ago, I described the NHS 
as “the theatre of inadequacy.”9 Just as opposition politicians 
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have an incentive to exaggerate, so do the medical and 
nursing professional bodies and others working in the NHS. 
Since NHS staff cannot exit, they must use voice to make the 
case for more resources and less pressure: and what better 
way to make such a case than by advertising shortcomings 
and failure? The strategies of opposition politicians and NHS 
professionals are therefore understandable, if regrettable; 
the case of academics who echo them is a different matter, 
inviting the charge of trahison des clercs.
But of course the NHS’s current financial troubles are only 
one reason for the claim that the service faces an existential 
threat. Underlying much of the rhetoric of doom is the 
assertion, as Powell shows, that the true nature of the NHS 
is being betrayed. We are in a Manichean world, of good 
battling evil. Successive Governments     – Blair’s Labour as 
well as Conservatives – have defiled Bevan’s Garden of Eden. 
They listened to the serpent’s voice, introduced competition 
and opened the door to the profit motive. They are in the 
process of privatising the NHS, whatever that protean word 
may mean.10 Unless policy goes into reverse gear, this line of 
argument concludes, there is no hope for the NHS.
What makes this rhetoric worrying is that the NHS does face 
a very tough challenge indeed in the next half decade or so, 
a challenge which makes the present financial problems (an 
overspend of a mere 1% or so of the total budget in 2014-
2015) look trivial. Driven by demography and technology, 
demand will increase: hence the £30 billion deficit (see above). 
Hence, too, the case for transformational changes in the way 
health and social care are organised. Hence too the scepticism 
about whether the changes – designed, above all, to develop 
care outside the hospital – can be achieved within the given 
time scale. Given the seriousness of the challenge, arguments 
about the true nature of the NHS are at best a luxury, at worst 
a distraction from debate about the issues and choices ahead. 
Which is why the dramaturgy, and the misuse of language, 
matter. 
To illustrate, let us take the case of  “privatisation.” Contracting 
out of services to for profit firms, social enterprises and local 
authorities has increased from £6.6 billion in 2009 to £10 
billion in 2014.11 The £10 billion represent only a small bite out 
of the NHS’s £113 billion budget, so talk of the privatisation 
of the NHS seems at best premature and at worst a misuse 
of language. However, given that the Health and Social Care 
Act 2012 (the Lansley Act) requires Clinical Commissioning 
Groups, responsible for spending about two thirds of the NHS 
budget, to put services out to competitive tender, the upward 
trend may continue. Does this matter?
The answer of those opposed to competition and contracting 
out is, as we have seen, clear cut: sound the alarm bells. So is 
the answer of those who are committed to competition and 
who assume private provision is, by definition, more efficient 
than public provision: forge ahead. Neither position is helpful. 
In some circumstances contracting out is clearly in the 
interests of NHS patients: ie, when private contractors have 
resources (including know how), competences or a flexibility 
that the NHS lacks. So, for example, the Blair Government’s 
bid to shrink waiting lists was only successful because it was 
able to mobilise the private sector, though paying over the 
odds at times. Conversely, there are other circumstances, 
and examples, where private contractors have made a hash of 
things (only think IT), where they have delivered disgracefully 
poor services (though that has been known to happen in the 
NHS as well, think Mid Staffordshire) or where they have 
skimmed off large profits.
Crucial in all this, of course, is the ability of the NHS to write 
tight contracts and to monitor them – not a minor challenge, 
given that there are now an estimated 53 000 contracts 
between the NHS and the private sector.12 It is the familiar 
principal-agent problem, where there may often be an 
asymmetry of information (and negotiating skills) favouring 
private bidders. And it places considerable administrative 
costs on the NHS. In short, the real argument about the 
scale and nature of contracting out must surely be about the 
managerial capacity of the NHS to ensure value for money 
and good service delivery, not about the supposedly corrosive 
nature or asserted merits of privatisation (however defined) 
in the abstract. 
Much the same can be said of the Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI), another emotive issue. This has indeed been a gravy 
train for private firms building hospitals under the scheme. 
Equally, it seems odd to lock the NHS into 30-year contracts 
when flexibility is the key to the “transformative” changes 
required. But there is another side to the story. PFI unlocked 
funds which allowed the NHS to modernise its stock of 
disgracefully shabby buildings on a scale that the Treasury, 
anxious not to inflate public sector borrowing requirements, 
never allowed. And it delivered new buildings on time and on 
price, in contrast to the NHS’s previous record of frequently 
over-running both time and budget. So once again the 
question is whether PFI is intrinsically flawed or whether it 
has been badly managed.
In the case of both contracting out and PFI, we simply do 
not know what the complete and complex balance sheet 
looks like, with anecdotes and single case examples feeding 
dogmatic prejudice on both sides of the argument. If such 
issues are not to distract from discussion of the difficult 
choices facing the NHS in the years ahead, we have to 
transform an ideological debate – where there will never be 
agreement – into an analysis of the balance between costs and 
benefits and of the NHS’s managerial capacity to limit the 
former and maximise the latter. If ever there was a case for 
evidence at least informing policy, this is it. And, to return to 
Powell’s paper, we have to exercise linguistic discipline and 
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